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ABSTRACT
Certain mathematical problems prove very hard to solve because some of their
intuitive features have not been assimilated or cannot be assimilated by the
available mathematical resources. This state of aﬀairs triggers an interesting
dynamic whereby the introduction of novel conceptual resources converts the
intuitive features into further mathematical determinations in light of which a
solution to the original problem is made accessible. I illustrate this phenomenon
through a study of Bertrand’s paradox.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mathematical problems often call for the introduction of new concepts or meth-
ods because certain intuitive features involved in their formulation cannot be
codiﬁed by the mathematical apparatus canonically available to study them.
In such cases what looks like an inherent diﬃculty of a given problem is best
regarded as an eﬀect of the fact that its intuitive content has not yet been
resolved into mathematical determinations that can be relied upon in order to
obtain a solution.
This paper aims to explore and clarify this phenomenon with respect to
one particular example, namely Bertrand’s paradox. The reasons for this
choice are threefold. First, Bertrand’s paradox is an interesting mathemati-
cal problem that has aroused much discussion among both philosophers and
mathematicians. Secondly, a recent exchange on the paradox contained in
[Rowbottom, 2013] and [Klyve, 2013] can be fruitfully reconsidered in light
of the phenomenon that this paper discusses.
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Finally, in view of this discussion, it is possible to introduce an elementary
approach to Bertrand’s paradox itself, motivated by the need to convert cer-
tain intuitive features of its geometrical setting into numerical determinations
(more plainly, it is necessary numerically to specify the size of certain inﬁnite
collections of geometrical entities). This move can be made once the canoni-
cal resources of probability theory are supplemented with new computational
resources. The next section extracts from the analyses of Rowbottom and Klyve
an interpretation of Bertrand’s paradox that stresses the incongruity between
canonical probability models and the character of this problem. It is because of
this incongruity that alternative probability models, to be introduced in Section
3, are required.
2. TWO READINGS OF BERTRAND’S PARADOX
If one were to draw at random a chord in a circle, what is the probability of its
being shorter than the side of the inscribed equilateral triangle? This question,
originally posed in [Bertrand, 1889], gives rise to a puzzle, generally known
as Bertrand’s paradox, on account of the fact that it is possible to specify
distinct, seemingly equivalent, drawing procedures, each of which determines
a distinct value for the sought probability. Bertrand speciﬁed three distinct
drawing procedures, leading respectively to the probability values 2/3, 1/2 and
3/4. The debate around the existence of a uniquely determined solution has
lasted longer than a century and has occupied several authors, such as Borel
[1909], Mosteller [1965] and Jaynes [1973].
Recently, the structure of Bertrand’s paradox and its interpretation have
been helpfully re-examined in [Rowbottom, 2013] and [Klyve, 2013].1 In my
view both papers shed important light on the character of the problem and,
more precisely, reveal it to be a problem of mathematical determination, in
the sense of Section 1. Rowbottom [2013] points out that Bertrand’s proposed
solutions are all inapplicable, since none of them takes all possible chords into
account. By eﬀectively restricting attention to a designated subcollection of
chords, those authors who selected one particular drawing procedure as the
correct one (e.g., Jaynes [1973]) could not reach an acceptable conclusion. As
Rowbottom points out:
[. . . ] in each case a chord was drawn [. . . ] at random from a proper subset
of the possible chords that might be drawn. [2013, p. 112]
This remark seems to me crucial because it indirectly suggests that Bertrand’s
question about the probability of drawing a chord at random is to be interpreted
as a question concerning the selection of a single chord with speciﬁc features
1Two important contributions on Bertrand’s paradox have followed these articles,
namely [Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014] and [Gyenis and Re´dei, 2015]. Their discus-
sion is deferred to the penultimate section, where it will be possible to oﬀer a suﬃciently
precise appreciation of these works’ signiﬁcance, in view of the full study of Bertrand’s
paradox provided in Section 3.
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from the totality of all chords. Various probability values arise because the type
of selection speciﬁable under any one of Bertrand’s drawing procedures may
operate on a restrictive ensemble, which is not representative of the random
selection of interest. Each procedure leads to the deployment of a continuous,
uniform probability distribution and, thus, to a probability model that can
be handled for the sake of computing numerical probability values. However,
the serviceability of Bertrand’s drawing procedures may be at variance with the
character of the problem, because all of them come at the cost of focussing on
a subcollection of the full collection of chords, which is not the ensemble one
intended to study in the ﬁrst place.
To see how this state of aﬀairs hints at a problem of mathematical deter-
mination, consider, by way of comparison, the trivial case of throwing a fair
die: in order to specify the probability that the outcome of a throw will be
a number strictly smaller than three, it is suﬃcient to consider the totality
of six outcomes and the totality of two outcomes of interest. The probability
model implicitly adopted in this case is a uniform, discrete distribution on the
space of outcomes resulting from a throw. The totality of outcomes as well as
the subset of relevant outcomes can be numerically speciﬁed and the numer-
ical speciﬁcations can then be used to carry out computations of probability
values. Bertrand’s question about selecting a chord from the totality of all
chords mirrors the character of the die problem in an inﬁnite setting. Row-
bottom simply points out that the question posed by Bertrand refers to the
totality of chords, not a part thereof, and to certain distinctive subcollections
of this totality. If probability values are to be computed, the inﬁnite collections
involved must be assigned numerical determinations. Following the template
of the die model, such determinations should lead to the introduction of a
uniform, discrete distribution on the numerically speciﬁable totality of chords.
This approach is not viable if the canonical resources of probability theory are
employed but, as will be shown in Section 3, it is accessible to supplementary
computational resources.
To sum up the discussion so far, Rowbottom’s analysis points to the need
for a direct consideration of the totality of chords determined by a circle. If
this totality is to be part of a workable probability model, a numerical estimate
of its size, with which ordinary arithmetical computations can be carried out,
must be available. In other words, an intuitive feature of Bertrand’s geometrical
setup, i.e., the fact that a circle determines an inﬁnite collection of chords, is
to be assigned a mathematical determination, i.e., a numerical speciﬁcation,
which cannot be oﬀered in the canonical (i.e., measure-theoretic) context of
probability theory. The possibility of introducing the missing determination
depends on an expansion of the mathematical resources at hand: since the
resources of probability theory are being used as instruments to intervene on
a given geometrical setup, I shall refer to them as a particular mathematical
instrumentality, or simply an instrumentality.
Thus, Bertrand’s paradox poses a problem of mathematical determination
that cannot be solved in presence of the canonical instrumentality of probability
theory but may well be solved through the appeal to a distinct instrumentality
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(which does not have to be a replacement of the canonical instrumentality, but
may be a modiﬁcation or extension thereof). As will be shown in Section 3,
the new instrumentality yields numerical speciﬁcations of the restrictions on
the ensemble of chords qualitatively alluded to by Rowbottom, but does not
rule out the possibility that some of these restrictions should oﬀer adequate
characterisations of the problem. Such a question cannot be decided upon in
the absence of a suitable mathematical determination of the problem itself.
Before oﬀering mathematical support to these remarks, I wish to turn to Klyve’s
analysis of Bertrand’s problem in order to show that it points to the dynamics
of determination and instrumentality revealed by Rowbottom’s own discussion,
albeit from a diﬀerent point of view and despite the fact that Klyve is critical
of Rowbottom’s conclusions. Against him, Klyve maintains that Bertrand’s
drawing procedures are adequate, i.e., actually take all chords into account, in
which case:
[t]he only thing that changes is that the method of selecting one (class
of) chord from this set may be biased. [Klyve, 2013, p. 368]
In my opinion Klyve’s important contribution does not lie in his intended refu-
tation of Rowbottom but in his focus on what he calls the bias of a procedure,
which is best spelled out as lack of mathematical determination and whose
source is not so much a selection of drawing method as the resort to a pre-
scribed instrumentality. In short, it seems to me possible at once to vindicate
the correctness of Rowbottom’s analysis and to extract from [Klyve, 2013] an
important lesson, which is independent of the rejection of [Rowbottom, 2013].
Klyve’s critique of Rowbottom is based on a close reading of Bertrand’s
manner of specifying his drawing procedures. For instance, with respect to the
procedure of ﬁxing a diameter and then restricting attention to the chords par-
allel to it (or, in fact, their intersections with the diameter), Bertrand observes
that ‘[t]he symmetry of the circle means that this information will not aﬀect the
probability, either favourably or unfavourably’ [Bertrand, 1889, p. 5]. By way
of commentary, Klyve notes that, since ‘every chord in a circle can be chosen
by the expedient of ﬁrst choosing a radius, and then choosing a perpendicular
chord’ [Klyve, 2013, p. 367], Bertrand’s drawing method does not involve a
distorting restriction to a proper subset of the chords in a circle. In fact, this
drawing method involves ﬁrst selecting a radius or, equivalently, a diameter, at
random, and then selecting a point from the diameter. Bertrand does not intro-
duce two random variables to model this selection process but assumes that a
random selection of the kind he is interested in ultimately corresponds to the
selection of a point from an arbitrarily ﬁxed diameter. What one ends up with
is a, seemingly viable, restriction to certain chords intersecting the diameter.
In the absence of further mathematical determination, it is an open question
whether this de facto restriction is viable, however plausible it might appear
(this issue will be addressed in Section 3.3). Analogously, although Klyve is
correct to point out that any chord can be determined by specifying a diam-
eter ﬁrst, he seems to underestimate the fact that Bertrand does not have an
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instrumentality that allows him to model the selection of single diameters and
to determine whether the possibility of selecting individual diameters may not
already suﬃce to model the selection of every other chord as well, without any
later restrictions to an array of points along a diameter superadded. A similar
argument applies to Klyve’s discussion of the drawing procedure determined
by ﬁrst picking an arbitrary point on a circumference and then drawing from
the ensemble of chords through it (whose adequacy will be discussed in Section
3.2).
Klyve’s argument does not therefore successfully undermine Rowbottom’s
insistence on the restrictiveness of the drawing procedures considered by
Bertrand: restrictions are eventually imposed, without mathematical determi-
nations that would enable a judgment on their adequacy. Despite the drawback
in his argument, Klyve makes a very important observation when he qualiﬁes
Bertrand’s original intention as follows:
[h]e wished only to show that the command to choose something at ran-
dom from an inﬁnite set is too imprecise unless we specify the means of
making the choice. [Klyve, 2013, p. 368]
This conclusion must suggest itself if one is an advocate of the absolute validity
of the canonical instrumentality of probability theory, which does not aﬀord
numerical means to, e.g., count alternatives over an inﬁnite set or deploy a
uniform, discrete distribution on it. If, however, one is not an absolute advocate
of a prescribed instrumentality, the same conclusion can be read as a call for
numerical resources that oﬀer a more precise speciﬁcation of the command to
choose a chord at random. Precisely this call will be answered in Section 3.
Thus, if one accepts Klyve’s interpretation of Bertrand’s intention, it reveals,
from an angle alternative to Rowbottom’s analysis, that the canonical instru-
mentality of probability theory is too imprecise or, in the present terminology,
lacks suﬃcient determination to tackle the problem of selecting a chord at ran-
dom. Thus, it is best to dismiss Klyve’s references to Bertrand’s results as eﬀects
of biassed drawing procedures that are suﬃciently well-determined mathemat-
ically. An independent reason for this can be oﬀered by a brief discussion of
the numerical example taken from Bertrand, upon which Klyve relies in order
to illustrate what he means by bias. The example is presented as a solution to
the problem of determining the probability of choosing a number greater than
50 by picking at random in the sample space {1, . . . , 100}. Given a uniform,
discrete distribution, the answer is trivial, but, since the numbers in the sample
space are uniquely determined by their squares, one might also decide to choose
over {1, . . . , 10, 000}, in which case the probability of drawing a number whose
square root is greater than 50 (but possibly not an integer) is 3/4 and not
1/2, as in the original setup. Klyve qualiﬁes the second problem as a variant of
the ﬁrst in which only the procedure for picking a number has changed, thus
introducing a bias. As a matter of fact, the sample space has changed from one
scenario to the other and the question being answered is no longer the same (in
the second case one is picking at random a number whose square root is greater
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than 50 and not a number greater than 50). It is certainly possible to exchange
a move to a diﬀerent sample space with a move to a diﬀerent distribution over
the same sample space {1, 2, 3, . . . , 100}, but the non-uniform distribution that
gives rise to the probability value 3/4 has been manufactured out of the explicit
consideration of a diﬀerent problem.
The problems in question here are easily distinguishable because suﬃcient
numerical speciﬁcations are available to tell them apart. What Klyve calls bias
reduces to their discriminability on numerical grounds. This reduction is less
straightforward in the context of Bertrand’s geometrical problem because there
are insuﬃcient numerical resources to identify restrictions and eﬀect discrimina-
tions. The same reduction becomes apparent, though, when sharper numerical
speciﬁcations can actually be used, as will be seen in the next section. What
Klyve calls an eﬀect of bias is in fact a problem of mathematical determination:
his remarks point in the same direction as Rowbottom’s. Under the canon-
ical instrumentality of probability theory, Bertrand’s paradox is intimately
connected with a lack of mathematical determination. Supplying resources
that provide a more sharply determined problem leads to a novel analysis of
Bertrand’s three drawing procedures and to some surprising conclusions about
their agreement. This is the subject of Section 3.
3. A STUDY OF BERTRAND’S PARADOX
The discussion from Section 2 has primarily served the purpose of identifying
Bertrand’s paradox as a determination problem: its root is the unavailability of
numerical speciﬁcations for certain inﬁnitely large collections of chords, from
which probability values may be computed. The intuitive idea that a circle
determines an inﬁnitely large number of chords, which in turn is the sum of
the numbers of chords longer, shorter, and equal to the side of the inscribed
equilateral triangle cannot be canonically rendered within a probability model.
The goal is then to introduce a new instrumentality under which the numerical
speciﬁcations being sought can be supplied. This will prove suﬃcient to set up
a probability model that describes the random selection of a chord in a manner
free from inadequacies caused by lack of mathematical determination.
The new instrumentality is obtained by supplementing the existing appara-
tus of concepts and techniques in probability theory with the computational
methodology recently introduced by Yaroslav Sergeyev (see in particular his
[2003; 2009a; 2009b]). In other words, the fundamental notions of probability
theory (e.g., sample space, distribution, random variable, etc.) are not jetti-
soned, but made to interact with computational resources that extend their
purview.
Sergeyev’s approach may be regarded as an inﬁnitary extension of numerical
analysis, whereby it becomes possible to introduce numerical approximations
of the sizes of inﬁnite collections or the length of inﬁnite processes. In the
present context, a numerical estimate of the collection of all chords determined
by a circle will be relied upon. Once this is available, the probability of the
events that interested Bertrand can be computed to a degree of accuracy,
which can be improved depending on the needed level of precision. In what
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follows, probability models are accurate enough to ﬁx the ﬁnite part of rele-
vant probability values. The starting point used to introduce inﬁnite numerical
estimates is to employ numerical measures of inﬁnite collections for which tra-
ditional ordered-ﬁeld arithmetic holds. This is necessary in order to compute
numerical probability values. Moreover, the required measures must be able to
discriminate between an inﬁnite collection and its inﬁnite subcollections. This
is necessary in order to keep track, in a computationally eﬀective way, of the
restrictions to inﬁnite subcollections of chords involved in Bertrand’s drawing
methods.
It is important to realise that the two desiderata just listed call for measures
alternative to Cantorian cardinals, which abrogate the principle that strict sub-
sets always have smaller measure than the sets including them. Ordinals are
unsuitable for the same reason. Moreover, in both cases ordinary arithmetical
laws fail:2 in other words, computational drawbacks and identiﬁcation between
part and whole make an appeal to Cantorian ideas unsuitable for supplying the
kind of mathematical determination required by inﬁnite probability models. It
is mandatory to look for a ‘counting’ measure that is computationally eﬀective
and reinstates the general principle that the part should be smaller than the
whole. These conditions are met by Sergeyev’s approach.3
Sergeyev’s informal approach consists in drawing a distinction between inﬁ-
nite collections, most notably N, and the numerals that refer to their elements
and to the sizes of their parts. In presence of this distinction, it is natural to
think that a richer numeral system than one relying on a ﬁnite base should sup-
port size discriminations between inﬁnite parts of a collection, not only between
ﬁnite ones. The desired enrichment is obtained by introducing a suitable base
for the richer numeral system, which, given the goal at hand, can only be inﬁn-
itely large. Sergeyev’s numeral system works with the inﬁnite base ① (read:
gross-one), which is intended to refer to the number of items in the inﬁnite
collection N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Then ① denotes an inﬁnitely large integer, greater
than the natural numbers representable in a ﬁnite base. The purpose of intro-
ducing ① is not merely to denote a speciﬁcation of the ‘level’ of inﬁnity attained
by the set of natural numbers, but to increase the discriminability of ‘levels’
in a way that vindicates the principle that the whole should be greater than
2For an illuminating discussion of this fact in the context of a construction of ‘counting
systems’ for inﬁnite sets alternative to those proposed by Cantor, see [Benci and Di Nasso,
2003, pp. 50–53].
3There are other ways of introducing systems of measures that extend to inﬁnite col-
lections the whole-part relation typical of ﬁnite ones and, in addition, are supported by
suﬃciently rich algebraic structure. A remarkable instance is provided by the numerosi-
ties of [Benci and Di Nasso, 2003]. Their approach is not equivalent to Sergeyev’s. To see
this, it suﬃces to note that, as will be shown below, on Sergeyev’s approach the sets of
even natural numbers and of multiples of three are assigned diﬀerent numerical measures.
Benci and Di Nasso work with labelled sets and numerosity assignments are sensitive to the
choice of labelling. In particular, there is a (non-canonical) labelling under which the last
two sets can be assigned the same numerosity. This possibility is ruled out in Sergeyev’s
framework, which does not require choices of labellings.
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the part. Thus, for instance, the set N ∪ 0 has a number of elements denoted
by ①+ 1 > ① and the set {2, 3, 4, . . .} has a number of elements denoted by ①
− 1 < ①. Moreover, as pointed out above, it is assumed that the familiar
laws of ﬁeld arithmetic extend to a notation for elements of the real ﬁeld that
includes terms expressible by means of the symbol ①. In this setting, the terms
① + 1,① + 2,① + 3, . . . , 2①, . . . , 3①, . . . ,①2, . . . all denote inﬁnitely large reals
not in N, which can be summed and multiplied in the usual manner. Mul-
tiplicative inverses satisfy identities like ①0 = ①1−1 = ① ·①−1 = ①① = 1 and
(①− 3) · (①− 1)−1 = ①−3①−1 = 1 −
2
①−1 , which will be used in section 3.1 below.
If one sought to develop arithmetic using, e.g., ∞ or ℵ0, the above expressions
would inevitably contain indeterminate forms.
For present purposes, ﬁeld arithmetic based on ① is not enough, because it
does not, on its own, allow enough numerical discriminations of size. In order
to compute the number of, say, chords in a circle that are as long as the side of
an inscribed equilateral triangle, it will prove necessary to rely on a divisibility
property that Sergeyev also postulates. Divisibility amounts to the assumption
that any partition of N into n disjoint arithmetic progressions, with n ﬁnite,
should have cells containing the same number of elements, denoted by ①/n.4
Note that ①/n, as the evaluation of the size of an inﬁnite aggregate, denotes an
inﬁnitely large natural number since ①/n < ①. It follows that the partition of
N into the two disjoint progressions of odd and even numbers determines two
cells containing the same inﬁnitely large number of items, denoted by ①/2. In
a similar vein, the numerical speciﬁcation of the collection of all multiples of
three is ①/3 < ①/2.
It is worth remarking that these ideas have been formalised in [Lolli, 2015],
within the context of a conservative extension of second-order, predicative
Peano arithmetic.5 Lolli’s idea is to work with models of arithmetic that contain
inﬁnitely large elements and to ﬁx an inﬁnitely large ‘cut-oﬀ’ point, denoted
by ①, intuitively intended to single out N within a larger model. Axioms gov-
erning a suitable measure guarantee that, given an initial segment of a model,
e.g., the set of all items satisfying x < ①, every subset thereof has a measure.
Measures so deﬁned identify (bounded) sets in one-to-one correspondence and
enforce the principle that the whole should be greater than the part. Divisibility
axioms guarantee that there is a suﬃciently rich family of measures that are
actually computable and can be expressed using Sergeyev’s numeral system.
Computability of measures guaranteed by divisibility will play a crucial role in
the discussion of Bertrand’s paradox to follow. In order to apply Sergeyev’s com-
putational methodology to it, it is necessary to decide how the chords in a circle
should be parametrised and what probability distribution is to be imposed upon
4More precisely, ①/n denotes the number of elements of any arithmetical progression
of the form k, k + n, k + 2n, . . ., with 1 ≤ k ≤ n and k, n ﬁnite. Once n is ﬁxed, letting k
increase from 1 to n, one obtains a partition of N into n progressions.
5The same treatment is possible on the basis of ﬁrst-order Peano arithmetic, at the
cost of cumbersome numerical coding. A discussion of this matter can be found in [Lolli,
2015, p. 9].
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them. In the next section the choice of an adequate parametrisation and distri-
bution will be ﬁrst motivated and then used to compute probability estimates.
3.1. A Counting Argument
Let C be a circle of unit radius in R2. In order to describe the random selection
of a chord from the collection of all chords in C, I shall adopt a strategy that
preserves the spirit of Bertrand’s treatment without requiring the restrictions
imposed by his drawing methods.
Since each of Bertrand’s methods relies on a uniform distribution, I shall
set up a probability model based on a uniform distribution. Because Sergeyev’s
methodology makes it possible to count chords, I am going to employ a uniform
discrete distribution, as opposed to Bertrand’s uniform continuous distribu-
tions. The choice of a uniform discrete distribution is also motivated by the
parallel between Bertrand’s setup and the throw of a fair die discussed in
Section 2.
As for the parametrisation of chords, one of Bertrand’s drawing methods
describes them uniquely by the pairs of their endpoints, one of which is a ﬁxed
point on the boundary of C. As will become clear in the following subsections,
this is the only parametrisation, among the three proposed by Bertrand, that
can be retained without having to restrict attention to a proper subcollection
of the full collection of chords in C. In the presence of Sergeyev’s methodology,
which presupposes the standpoint of numerical analysis, the parametrisation of
chords by pairs of distinct points on the boundary of C depends on a prelim-
inary speciﬁcation of the number of discriminable points. It is of the essence
to realise that, when handling the computational instrumentality proposed by
Sergeyev, there is no question, in general, of obtaining exact numerical results:
in what follows only approximate probability values or probability estimates
are computed. This is, however, enough to restrict the range of inaccuracy to
an inﬁnitely small order of magnitude.
The degree of accuracy selected to deal with Bertrand’s problem is ﬁxed as
soon as it is declared, by means of a numerical speciﬁcation, how many points
on the boundary of the circle C can be discriminated. In general, if the numeral
system adopted includes the symbol n, denoting a natural number, then the
partition of C into equal arcs of length 2π/n makes it possible to discriminate
distinct points on the boundary of C by assigning them distinct labels from
the list {1, 2, . . . , n}. This may not be very helpful if one can only end up
with ﬁnitely many discriminable points, but it becomes a fruitful approach if
an inﬁnitely large number of discriminations can be eﬀected. An obvious, but
fruitful, choice is to set n equal to ① (greater, inﬁnitely large, numbers could
also be chosen, depending on the required level of accuracy6). A numerical
6One could, e.g., pick ①2 or ①3, both of which are evenly divided by 3, by divisibility,
a fact on which the argument that follows relies. One could even consider 3 · 10① discrim-
inable points, which measures the continuum [0, 3), if one deploys a numeral system based
on decimal expansions with ① places, each of which is ﬁlled by one digit from the list
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Fig. 1. Labelled points around C.
speciﬁcation of discriminable points leads to a direct computation of the number
of discriminable chords.
As Figure 1 shows, this computation is based on the subdivision of C’s bound-
ary into least discriminable arcs marked by ① equally spaced, labelled points.
A discriminable chord is uniquely determined by a pair of labelled points on
the circumference. Once a labelled endpoint is ﬁxed, ①−1 discriminable chords
through it may be counted. As one ranges through the ① labelled endpoints,
①(① − 1) discriminable chords are counted, but each chord is counted twice,
since the two distinct orderings of its labelled endpoints are counted as dis-
tinct chords. As a consequence, the total number of discriminable chords is the
inﬁnitely large integer denoted by the term:
①2 −①
2
.
The last numerical speciﬁcation, inexpressible in a traditional numeral sys-
tem and, thus, within the canonical instrumentality of probability theory, goes
some way towards addressing the determination problem identiﬁed in Section
2. Whereas it was not possible, under any of Bertrand’s drawing methods, to
rely on a numerical speciﬁcation of the full collection of chords in C, an inﬁnite
estimate of the number of discriminable chords is now available. In its pres-
ence, it is possible to introduce a uniform, discrete distribution on the sample
space of discriminable chords. Such a distribution assigns each chord the inﬁn-
itely small probability 2/(①2 −①). A simple probability model is now in place,
which leads to the computation of probability estimates for the events we are
interested in.
{0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}. In this case, 10① points are discriminable on [0, 1) and three times this
number on [0, 3).
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In particular, let P (e), P (s), P (l) be, respectively, the probability of selecting
a discriminable side of some equilateral triangle inscribed in C, the probability
of selecting a shorter chord, and the probability of selecting a longer chord. The
problem set by Bertrand is to evaluate P (s). Since 1 = P (e)+P (s)+P (l) once
P (e), P (s) are computed, a value for P (l) can also be determined.
In order to compute P (e), it is convenient to count ﬁrst the number of points
that lie on any arc subtended by the side of some equilateral triangle inscribed
into C. Since the whole arc has length 2π/3 and two consecutive, discriminable
points are separated by an arc of inﬁnitesimal width 2π/①, there are ①/3
least discriminable arcs covering one third of the circumference. Note that ①/3
denotes a natural number, by divisibility. It now follows that an arc of length
2π/3 contains ①/3 + 1 discriminable points. It is convenient to work with the
assignment of labels 1, 2, . . . ,①−1,① illustrated in Figure 1. Any discriminable
side of an inscribed equilateral triangle is uniquely determined when one of its
discriminable endpoints is ﬁxed. The other endpoint is identiﬁed by summing
①/3 to the label on the endpoint that has been ﬁxed. The discriminable sides
of equilateral triangles inscribed in C are thus systematically identiﬁed by the
following pairs of labels:7(
1,
①
3
+ 1
)
,
(
2,
①
3
+ 2
)
, . . . ,
(
2①
3
+ 1, 1
)
,
(
2①
3
+ 2, 2
)
, . . . ,
(
①, ①
3
)
.
Along this sequence, which has ① elements, no pair is counted twice. It is clear
that all discriminable pairs are counted, since their endpoints are only assigned
labels from {1, 2, . . . ,①− 1,①}. It follows that there are ① discriminable sides
of inscribed equilateral triangles, i.e.:
P (e) =
2
①− 1 .
The value of P (e) just computed is a positive inﬁnitesimal. It would have been
inexpressible under the canonical instrumentality of probability theory, which
assimilates the selection of the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle to the
impossible event (its probability is zero in each of the three scenarios considered
by Bertrand).
In order to ﬁnd P (s), it now suﬃces to consider the discriminable chords con-
taining ①/3 or fewer points. There are ① times ①/3 discriminable chords shorter
than the side of the inscribed equilateral triangle. When the degenerate ones,
consisting of one point, are excluded, only (①2 − 3①)/3 chords are left. Then:
P (s) =
①2 − 3①
3
· 2
①2 −① =
①(①− 3)
3
· 2①(①− 1)
=
①− 3
3
· 2①− 1 =
2
3
· ①− 3①− 1 =
2
3
·
(
1 − 2①− 1
)
=
2
3
− 4
3(①− 1) .
7 It is perhaps worth noting that no appeals to symmetry, of the kind required in
[Jaynes, 1973], are needed in this argument. It suﬃces to have deployed only a convenient
reference frame, in which consecutive numeral labels are attached to consecutive points.
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Fig. 2. Chords through a ﬁxed point.
This is an evaluation of the probability requested in the problem set up by
Bertrand. It is inﬁnitely close to 2/3. It is ﬁnally possible to compute:
P (l) = 1 − [P (s) + P (e)] = 1 −
(
2
3
− 4
3(①− 1) +
2
①− 1
)
= 1 −
(
2
3
+
2
3(①− 1)
)
=
1
3
− 2
3(①− 1) ,
whose ﬁnite part is 1/3. Although the analysis carried out in this section can be
reﬁned by more accurate numerical estimates (see fn 5), information about the
ﬁnite part of the estimates P (s) or P (l) is already available. Furthermore, it
is possible to reconsider Bertrand’s drawing methods as giving rise to approxi-
mations of the probability model introduced in this subsection and assess their
adequacy against it. The next subsections are devoted to carrying out precisely
this task.
3.2. Selecting Chords Through a Fixed Point
Among the three drawing procedures considered by Bertrand, let us consider
ﬁrst the one that represents the random selection of a chord’s endpoint, followed
by another endpoint selection, as a de facto selection from the collection of
chords in C through an arbitrary ﬁxed point on the circumference. Using the
system of ① labels illustrated in Figure 1, we may conveniently ﬁx the point
whose numeral label is 1 (see Figure 2).
In this case only ① − 1 out of (①2 − ①)/2 discriminable chords are being
taken into account. Rowbottom’s observation to the eﬀect that only a proper
subcollection of chords is taken into account can be numerically vindicated. Now
let us call P1(e), P1(s), P1(l) the probabilities of selecting a chord respectively
equal, shorter, or longer, than the side of an equilateral triangle inscribed in C,
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from the ensemble of ① − 1 chords through the point marked by the numeral
label 1. As in Section 3.1, the probabilities sought can be computed from a
uniform, discrete distribution imposed on the given collection of chords.
Since only the chords determined by the endpoints (1,①/3 + 1) and (2①/
3+1, 1) are sides of inscribed equilateral triangles, we immediately have P1(e) =
2/(①−1) = P (e). The fact that the last probability is the same as that obtained
by the unrestricted method from the previous subsection depends on the fact
that, under the given drawing procedure, the relative proportions of types of
chords are preserved, although their numbers are scaled by the inﬁnitesimal
factor 2/①.
This is conﬁrmed by the computation of P1(s), which can be determined by
noting that there are ①/3 − 1 discriminable chords from 1 to the consecutive
vertices labelled by 2, 3, 4, . . .①/3− 1,①/3 respectively: all of these chords are,
among those singled out by the drawing procedure, shorter than the side of
an equilateral triangle inscribed in C. Since the chords are symmetrically dis-
tributed relative to the diameter through 1, the total number of chords shorter
than the side of an equilateral triangle inscribed in C is 2(①/3 − 1), i.e., the
number for the chords shorter than the side of an equilateral triangle obtained
in Section 3.1, scaled by the factor 2/①. As a result:
P1(s) =
2(①− 3)
3
1
①− 1 =
2
3
①− 3
①− 1 =
2
3
− 4
3(①− 1) = P (s).
It follows that P1(l) = P (l). The drawing method just examined is a scaled ver-
sion of the full model constructed in the previous subsection and thus exhibits
no discrepancy relative to it. Compared with the same model, Bertrand’s orig-
inal treatment of this drawing method leads to the ﬁnite part of P (s) and
underestimates the inﬁnitesimal part by setting it equal to zero.
In light of the new instrumentality applied so far, one is led to the interesting
conclusion that the restriction of a full model for Bertrand’s problem obtained
by focussing on a proper part of the collection of all discriminable chords does
not per se lead to an inadequate model: this is because scaled models are as good
as the full model. In this respect, one may diﬀer from Rowbottom’s conclusion
that Bertrand’s drawing methods are all inapplicabile because they restrict
attention to a sample space that does not include all chords. In a similar manner,
one may agree with Klyve’s remark to the eﬀect that considering chords through
a ﬁxed endpoint does not undermine the validity of a model for Bertrand’s
problem. The last conclusions, however, become possible and meaningful only
once the new instrumentality used here aﬀords a subtler assessment of modelling
choices.
3.3. Parallel Chords
Let us now turn to the drawing procedure that corresponds to the selection of a
diameter and then a chord perpendicular to it, which is represented by Bertrand
as the de facto selection of a chord from the ensemble of those perpendicular
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Fig. 3. Parallel chords.
to a ﬁxed diameter. In the present context, this selection restricts the indepen-
dently given ensemble of discriminable chords to those perpendicular to a ﬁxed
diameter and, thus, parallel to one another.
Let P2(e), P2(s), P2(l) be the probabilities of selecting a chord respectively
equal, shorter, or longer than the side of an equilateral triangle inscribed in C
from the restricted ensemble. In order to study this case as an approximation of
the model from Section 3.1 — based on a suitable uniform, discrete distribution
— it is convenient to focus on the chords perpendicular to the diameter through
the point labelled by 1 (see Figure 3).
Among these chords, the single one that is also a diameter has endpoints
marked by the numerals ①/4 + 1 and 3①/4 + 1. The ﬁrst of these numerals
is identiﬁed by observing that the arc of length π/2 traced clockwise from the
point labelled by 1 is covered by①/4 least arcs and must therefore contain①/4+
1 points. The second numeral is obtained by a similar argument. Elementary
geometry shows that the chords with endpoints labelled by the following pairs:
(2,①), (3,① − 1), (4,① − 2), . . . , (①/4 + 1, 3①/4 + 1), are all perpendicular to
the diameter that has been ﬁxed. Because these chords are counted by the
consecutive labels from 2 to ①/4 + 1, there are ①/4 of them, including the
diameter between ①/4 + 1 and 3①/4 + 1. The same situation arises in the
lower semicircle from Figure 3. As a consequence, the total number of chords
determined by the drawing procedure is ①/2−1 (the diameter in this ensemble
being counted only once).
It is clear that, among the parallel chords, only two can be sides of an
inscribed equilateral triangle (one of them has endpoints labelled by 5①/6 + 1
and ①/6 + 1 and subtends the arc containing these points as well as the point
labelled by 1; the other is the reﬂection of the ﬁrst in the diameter parallel to
both). We can therefore compute:
P2(e) = 2
2
①− 2 =
4
①− 2 .
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In order to determine P2(s), note that each semicircle in C contains ①/6− 1
chords perpendicular to the ﬁxed diameter and shorter than the side of
an inscribed equilateral triangle. The pairs (2,①), (3,① − 1), (4,① − 2),
. . . , (①/6, 5①/6 + 2) determine the relevant chords in one semicircle (the next
pair of endpoints in this list determines the side of an equilateral triangle).
It can be deduced that the whole circle contains ①/3 − 2 chords, along the
given direction of parallelism, that are shorter than the side of an inscribed
equilateral triangle. Thus:
P2(s) =
①− 6
3
2
①− 2 =
2
3
− 8
3(①− 2) .
Then, clearly:
P2(l) = 1 − (P2(e) + P2(s)) = 13 −
4
3(①− 2) .
Relative to the combinatorial argument from Section 3.1, the values obtained
for this drawing procedure exhibit an inﬁnitesimal discrepancy of order ①−1
because the chords connecting consecutive discriminable points are systemati-
cally neglected. They were, on the contrary, included in the counts from Sections
3.1 and 3.2 (in the latter case, one of the consecutive points had to have the
numeral label 1.). Nevertheless, the ﬁnite parts of P (s), P1(s) and P2(s), as well
as those of P (l), P1(l) and P2(l), are the same.
Bertrand’s original treatment of the drawing method just discussed leads to
the probability value 1/2. With the new instrumentality employed so far, the
same value can be simulated, up to a discrepancy of order ①−1, by setting up
a probability model for the random selection of a point from a diameter, once
it is declared that ① + 1 points can be discriminated along a ﬁxed diameter.
It is worth emphasising that Bertrand could not oﬀer a numerical model for
the selection of single diameters (or directions), when describing his drawing
methods. He thus resorted to the assumption that the draw ultimately reduces
to picking a chord perpendicular to a diameter. In the presence of sharper
numerical determinations, the random selection of a diameter can be explicitly
described, and it gives rise to an ensemble of endpoints around the circle that
suﬃces to set up the model from Section 3.1.
In the presence of this model, the selection of a chord from those perpendicu-
lar to an arbitrary diameter is entirely describable without superadding chords
assigned to a uniform distribution of discriminable points along a particular
diameter. That such superaddition introduces a distortion is revealed by the
fact that, given a partition of the boundary of C into equal arcs, the discrim-
inable chords orthogonal to a ﬁxed diameter will not partition it into equal
intervals. When the distortion is removed, probability values that are ﬁnitely
accurate can still be obtained.
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3.4. Selecting Midpoints of Chords
Let c designate the centre of C and let C′ be C with c removed. Any point x
in the interior of C′ determines the unique chord perpendicular to the radius
through x and c, of which x is the midpoint. Exploiting this fact, one might
hope to reduce the selection of chords to the selection of points in the interior
of C. In view of the discussion from the previous subsection, one should be wary
of identifying a probability model for the random selection of an interior point
from C with a probability model for the random selection of a chord.
One may, however, require that discriminable interior points be midpoints
of discriminable chords, in which case the model set up in Section 3.1 can be
adopted. Its introduction does not immediately allow one to focus on discrim-
inable interior points only, though, because, even if it is possible to identify
each point in the interior of C′ with the unique chord of which it is the mid-
point, this identiﬁcation breaks down for the centre c of C, the midpoint of
a continuum of diameters. The eﬀect of identifying inﬁnitely many diameters
with their common midpoint cannot be evaluated under the canonical instru-
mentality of probability theory and, thus, there is no way of telling whether it
fundamentally distorts the sought probability values.
In presence of Sergeyev’s computational methodology, however, a numerical
estimate of the distortion can be obtained by looking again at the model from
Section 3.1 and taking the discriminable interior points of C to be the midpoints
of discriminable chords determined by pairs of labelled endpoints. In this case
the centre of C is the common midpoint of ①/2 discriminable diameters. The
discriminable midpoints in the interior of C are therefore:
①(①− 1)
2
−
(①
2
− 1
)
=
①(①− 2) + 2
2
.
Since a diameter is longer than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle,
the number of discriminable midpoints of chords shorter than such a side is
the same as in Section 3.1, namely ①(①−3)/3. Calling P3(s) the probability of
selecting the midpoint of a chord shorter than the side of an inscribed equilateral
triangle, it is now easy to compute:
P3(s) =
①(①− 3)
3
2
①(①− 2) + 2 =
2
3
− 2
3
⎛
⎜⎝
1 − 2①
①− 2 + 2①
⎞
⎟⎠,
whose discrepancy from P (s) is of order ①−1, i.e., ﬁnite agreement holds.
Thus, given a preliminary speciﬁcation of the number of discriminable diam-
eters, their identiﬁcation with c does not aﬀect a probability estimate if only
accuracy of order ①0 is required. However, in order to reach this conclusion, a
numerical speciﬁcation of the inﬁnite collection of discriminable diameters is to
be given, and this cannot be done by declaring a distribution of points in the
interior of C alone, but only by specifying the totality of discriminable chords as
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was done in Section 3.1. The viability of the drawing method based on interior
points is subject to the introduction of the parametrisation adopted in Section
3.1. When this drawing method is viable, it must be in ﬁnite agreement with
the results obtained for the original model.
Bertrand’s application of the same drawing method, however, leads to the
probability value 3/4 for P3(s). The latter value can be simulated under
Sergeyev’s instrumentality, up to an inﬁnitesimal error, by a model that speci-
ﬁes the discriminable points in the interior of C by taking ① discriminable points
on a ﬁxed radius and then assuming that the circle through the nth discrim-
inable point (1 ≤ n ≤ ①) contains n discriminable points. This model imposes
a uniform distribution upon a collection of points that are not homogeneously
spread over the interior of C: fewer and fewer points are discriminable as one
approaches its centre. The model also describes a random choice unrelated to
the selection of a chord from an ensemble homogeneously distributed around
the circle, which was dealt with in Section 3.1.
In view of the previous subsections, it is possible to conclude that, when such
homogeneous distribution is ﬁxed as the geometrical conﬁguration of reference,
the drawing methods proposed by Bertrand are in ﬁnite agreement and only
generate inﬁnitely small discrepancies. If, on the other hand, one replaces the
geometrical conﬁguration attached to the parametrisation of chords as pairs
of labelled endpoints with other geometrical ensembles (points on a diameter,
interior points), which in turn lead to distinct random selection processes, then
probability values proliferate.
4. TWO CANONICAL RESOLUTIONS
In Section 2, I argued that a satisfactory approach to Bertrand’s paradox
requires an expansion of the canonical instrumentality of probability theory.
In Section 3, I have shown that, under the expansion aﬀorded by Sergeyev’s
computational methodology, a numerical treatment of Bertrand’s paradox can
be given, under which the three drawing methods are in ﬁnite agreement when
regarded as approximations to a model that describes the random selection of
a chord from the totality of all chords in a circle C. Two recent papers present
results that seem to be at variance with these conclusions.
On the one hand, [Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014] purports to provide
a resolution of Bertrand’s paradox by canonical means and obtains the value
1/2 for P (s). On the other hand, [Gyenis and Re´dei, 2015] defuses Bertrand’s
paradox by oﬀering a mathematical account of the proliferation of probability
values as an unproblematic phenomenon. In the next two subsections I shall
explain why the resolution proposed by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi is unsat-
isfactory and in what way the analysis provided by Gyenis and Re´dei is not
only consistent with the study of Bertrand’s paradox articulated in Section 3
but indirectly conﬁrms it.
4.1. Averaging Over Drawing Methods
Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi draw a distinction between an easy problem
and a hard problem raised by Bertrand’s paradox. The easy problem is to
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/philm
at/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/philm
at/nkx035/4753688 by U
niversity of East Anglia user on 04 O
ctober 2018
18 • Rizza
ﬁgure out why the fact that distinct probability values arise from distinct
chord selection procedures does not contradict the principle of indiﬀerence
(very roughly, the principle that no particular selection outcomes are more
likely to occur than others). The hard problem is to obtain a uniquely deter-
mined value for P (s). In order to tackle the easy problem, Aerts and Sassoli
de Bianchi note that the question posed by Bertrand (stated at the beginning
of Section 3) admits of distinct empirical reiﬁcations, up to a certain degree of
idealisation.
In particular, one may concretely mark oﬀ the extent of a chord by throwing
a stick on a circular surface (provided the stick always falls on the surface).
The observation, found in [Rowbottom, 2013], concerning the restrictiveness
of Bertrand’s drawing methods is translated by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi
into the remark that these methods are not satisfactory models of the random
throw of a stick. This conclusion is consistent with the analysis of Section 3,
which pointed out in what ways some of Bertrand’s probability values can be
simulated by describing random selection processes distinct from the selection
of a chord.
As for the hard problem, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi start from the obser-
vation that the probability values generated by Bertrand’s methods are to be
seen as particular, biassed values, constrained by a certain restriction on the
drawing procedure.
In view of this, they go on to produce a clever construction that allows
them to obtain a universal mean of selection procedures, each represented by a
density function that is the limit of suitable step functions. They ﬁnally identify
the value of their universal mean, namely 1/2, with P (s). The correctness of
their mathematical treatment does not lead to a value for P (s) because the
objects averaged over do not encode faithful information about the geometrical
character of Bertrand’s problem.
This is true in the light of Aerts’s and Sassoli de Bianchi’s own remarks,
but it is even more apparent when the results of Section 3 are taken into
account. These results showed not only that some drawing procedures distort
the original random selection problem, when modelled as geometrical selec-
tions other than a direct selection of chords (e.g., as the random selection of
a point from a segment), but also that Bertrand’s drawing procedures lead to
the same ﬁnite estimate of P (s), if they are regarded as restricted versions of a
random selection process on an ensemble of homogeneously distributed chords.
Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi cannot avail themselves of the last conclusion,
because it is inaccessible from the point of view of the canonical instrumen-
tality of probability theory. Thus, they seem willing to accept that there is
nothing better to do than averaging over arbitrary distortions of the original
selection problem. This strategy may be forced upon one in possession of exclu-
sively the canonical instrumentality, but it must be dismissed once the insights
provided by an application of Sergeyev’s computational methodology are
available.
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4.2. Defusing the Paradox
Gyenis and Re´dei frame their discussion of Bertrand’s paradox in the context of
what they call the elementary classical interpretation of probability theory. The
motivation for this approach is the common interpretation of the paradox as a
violation of the principle of indiﬀerence. Gyenis and Re´dei show that what is
involved in Bertrand’s paradox is not a violation of the principle of indiﬀerence
but a violation of a distinct property called labelling invariance.
Their argument begins with the observation that it is easy to satisfy a con-
dition of neutrality, which corresponds to the principle of indiﬀerence, on ﬁnite
sample spaces, by imposing uniform, discrete distributions upon them. Under
the canonical instrumentality of probability theory, inﬁnite sample spaces do
not allow the introduction of uniform, discrete distributions but it is possible
to reinstate neutrality by a suitable addition of topological structure.8
If one then works within a suitable category of topologically enriched mea-
sure spaces, a version of the principle of indiﬀerence can still be satisﬁed, and
Bertrand’s paradox continues to hold. Its occurrence does not therefore vio-
late a neutrality condition, but turns out to violate another property, namely
labelling invariance.
In order to understand what this is, note that, for ﬁnite X = {x1, . . . , xn},
it amounts to the fact that the probability of an event A ⊆ X is not altered
by a reassignment of numerical indices, i.e., a relabelling. When X is inﬁnitely
large, relabellings must be deﬁned as measurable bijections with measurable
inverses. Invariance then amounts to the fact that any relabelling is a measure-
theoretic isomorphism between two spaces describing the same phenomenon.9
Its violation is then nothing but the fact that the probability value P (s) is not
preserved across Bertrand’s probability models. In view of Section 3, this kind
of violation may be regarded as a pointer to diﬀerences between the probability
models that cannot be fully detected by the canonical instrumentality. In other
words, it is an indicator of the level of canonical discriminability between these
models.
Under the enriched instrumentality supplied by Sergeyev’s computational
methodology, discrimination power does not only increase, but becomes math-
ematically informative. This is because, if one tries to simulate the probability
values obtained by Bertrand using Sergeyev’s computational methodology, one
ends up with probability models whose sample spaces do not contain the same
number of elements (e.g., the ﬁrst drawing method takes into account ① − 1
discriminable chords whereas the second drawing method takes into account
①+ 1 discriminable points).10
8Details are not important here but may be found in [Gyenis and Re´dei, 2015,
pp. 355–356].
9The qualiﬁcation in italics is explicitly assumed by Gyenis and Re´dei. For a rigorous
deﬁnition of labelling invariance, see [Gyenis and Re´dei, 2015, pp. 357–358].
10Diﬀerent numbers of chords are obtained even when Bertrand’s drawing methods are
described as approximations to the random selection from Section 3.1.
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Even if these models are based on sample spaces that are classically indis-
tinguishable relative to size, if one relies on the ﬁner numerical distinctions of
size aﬀorded by the numeral system based on ①, it becomes clear that what
looked like indistinguishable collections cannot in fact be related by bijections.
In eﬀect, as was argued in Section 3, the probability models that simulate
Bertrand’s distinct probability values may not even be seen as models of the
same phenomenon. This diﬀerence was not visible under the canonical instru-
mentality other than as a failure of labelling invariance, whereas it becomes
transparent after the shift to a numerically more expressive instrumentality is
carried out.
It follows that Gyenis and Re´dei do not only provide a subtle analysis of
Bertrand’s paradox within a canonical context, but also pinpoint the canonical
property whose failure corresponds to an actual diﬀerentiation between models
once Bertrand’s problem is endowed with the canonically missing numerical
determinations. It is noteworthy that, under Sergeyev’s methodology, labelling
invariance holds, either because there are no bijections joining the relevant
spaces or because a straightforward generalisation of this notion for a ﬁnite
sample space is available.
5. SUMMARY
This paper explored one aspect of mathematical thinking, which is equally
signiﬁcant in a pure and an applied context, and may be referred to as the
dynamics of determination and instrumentality. Certain mathematical prob-
lems, as well as mathematised empirical problems, occur within an enquiry
as objects of investigation calling for symbolic instruments adequate to their
character and, thus, capable of tackling them. It may well be the case that a
canonical array of instruments should prove insuﬃcient to carry out a success-
ful intervention upon a problem, in which case the forging of new instruments
is required if progress in enquiry is to be made.
Bertrand’s paradox nicely illustrates a situation in which canonical instru-
ments are not eﬀective because they cannot render into computationally
serviceable terms certain features of the problem at hand, namely numerical
speciﬁcations of inﬁnite collections of chords. Once new computational instru-
ments, such as those coming from Sergeyev’s methodology, are introduced,
greater insight into the paradox can be gained and certain diﬃculties produced
by resort exclusively to the canonical instrumentality of probability theory are
overcome.
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